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Abstract: This paper provides a brief overview of Turkey’s soft power in 
Austria through the example of the faith-based public diplomacy institu-
tion ATİB (Avusturya Türkiye İslam Birliği‚ Türkisch-Islamische Union 
in Österreich), a branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey 
(Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). It addresses the significance of ATİB with re-
gard to the religious and cultural needs of the Turkish Muslim community 
in Austria and the negative perceptions of Turkey’s soft power strategy 
in this country. The paper also focuses on the current challenges faced by 
the ATİB, as well as by Austria’s Muslim community in general, as a re-
sult of the Law on Islam that was adopted in 2015 (Islamgesetz 2015) and 
the accompanying discussions around Muslim associations financed from 
abroad. The research design is primarily based on a critical discourse anal-
ysis of political and academic debates about the ATİB, the 2015 Islam Law, 
and their catalyzing effect on Islamophobia in Austria. 
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Due to the large numbers of Muslims in Austria3, the public discourse is 
also focused on the integration of the Muslim population in Europe, and 
Islamophobic incidents including discrimination against Muslims in the ar-
eas of employment, education, and religious practices. As we can see from 
the ‘Anti-Muslim Racism Report’ for 2020, anti-Muslim hate crimes and 
Islamophobic incidents in Austria rose by a third over the course of the 
reporting period, from 2019 to 2020 (Antimuslimischer Rassismus Report, 
2020).
In recent years, origin-oriented religious institutions have also featured more 
and more frequently in the Austrian public discourse. Defined for the purpos-
es of this research as origin-oriented institution we understand associations 
that are initiated by diaspora living in Austria or foreign state organized as-
sociations manly for promoting culture, language and religion of the country 
of origin. Among the most prominent and controversial of those currently 
operating in Austria, noteworthy examples include Islamische Föderation 
(IF) and Österreichisch-türkische Föderation (ATF) – Avusturya Türk Feder-
asyonu (Addendum, 2020, May 18). In this context, the Turkish faith-based 
institution ATİB is of particular interest, due to its important role in the Turk-
ish state’s expanding soft-power approach to foreign policy.
The following paper takes a closer look at the origin-oriented faith based 
public diplomacy institution ATİB (Avusturya Türkiye İslam Birliği‚ Türk-
isch-Islamische Union in Österreich), a branch of the Turkish Presidency 
of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) — hereinafter referred to as 
Diyanet. The aim of this paper is not to deal with political developments in 
Turkey, but to explain the backlash against Turkey’s soft power in Austria, 
the allegations against the ATİB, and the challenges faced by Turkish Mus-
lims in the country since 2015, when the Islam Law ignited a new wave of 
public discussions and restrictions (Islamgesetz 2015). Before starting with 
the core content of the paper, it is necessary to explain the theoretical con-
cept of soft power and its main instrument, public diplomacy (Nye 2004, 
2011).
3 According to the research report ‘Muslim Diversity - A Compass on Everyday Reli-
gious Practice in Austria’ from 2017, around 202.901 Muslims have Austrian citizenship, 
and 114.119 Muslims have Turkish citizenship. Muslims in Austria with Turkish migra-
tion background are the biggest Muslim group in Austria followed by the Muslims from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (50.995) Former Yugoslavia (21.419) and Macedonia (14.722) 
(Aslan et al., 2017, 25-29)
Introduction
After the first coup of the Freedom Party in Austria (FPÖ) in 1999, which 
was preceded by an anti-foreigner (and especially anti-Muslim) campaign 
and followed by the 9/11 attacks, Islamophobia in Austria intensified 
(Hafez, 2010). Muslim immigrants in particular continued to be a focus 
of political debates, where Islam was represented and stereotyped as 
incompatible with European values in the public discourse (Wets, 2006). 
Due to the long historical presence of Islam in Europe which has been 
expanded considerably by recent migrations, the discussions also focus on 
the outstanding features of Islam, as Basam Tibi emphasizes:
“[T]he problem is not the number of 
Muslim people living in Europe, but rather 
what Islam is coming to Europe. Is it Euro-
pean Islam, enlightened Islam compatible and 
consonant with the civilizational identity of 
Europe, or is it Shari’a-Islam? This is the real 
issue and this is what the future of Europe is 
all about.” (Tibi, 2008, 71).
The content of the debates held in public space varies in regard to the topics 
encompassed and the conclusions commonly reached. Particularly since 
the phenomenon of radicalization associated with the Islamic religion has 
become an increasingly tangible element of public discourse in Austria, the 
breadth of these debates has widened. We can see this, for example, in the 
response of the former interior minister, Herbert Kickl (Freedom Party of 
Austria), to the decision to declare the headscarf ban in elementary schools 
unconstitutional: 
“In its decision on the headscarf ban, 
the Constitutional Court seems to have for-
gotten for which type of state the constitution, 
the guardian of which it is intended to be, was 
written - namely for a democratic constitution-
al state, in which fundamental and freedom 
rights are guaranteed, and not for an Islamic 
Republic” (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub – 
FPÖ, 2020, December 11).2 
2 Translated by the author.
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ments. Therefore, it is said that “soft power […] is hard to use, easy to lose, 
and costly to re-establish” (Nye, 2011, 83f). Additionally, Brannagan & Gi-
ulianotti (2018, 1140) identify the phenomenon of “soft disempowerment” 
which refers to the potential “unintended and weakening consequences” 
which can result from soft power strategies. They go on to explain that soft 
disempowerment commonly arises from three practices: “contravening in-
ternational laws and rules,” “failing to uphold international conventions or 
standards on global development,” and acting in ways that are perceived to 
“have direct and negative impacts on other individual nations or commu-
nities of nations” (ibd., 1152ff). Whereas soft power is an attempt to wield 
“attraction” in foreign policy, soft disempowerment describes the effects of 
“unattractiveness,” due to actions that are considered unacceptable, on the 
perceptions of nations in foreign countries (ibd., 1152).
Cultural activities which promote the foreign policy interests of a state by 
building a positive image (Hubinger, 2006: 85; Pajtnika, 2014, 100) fall un-
der the domain of cultural diplomacy and soft power. Apart from promot-
ing the culture and identity of the nation in question, other activities aim to 
disseminate cultural values and encourage public engagement, such as the 
negotiation of treaties on cultural cooperation, and the maintenance of ties 
with expatriate communities (Pajtnika, 2014, 95, 103f). Cummings (2003, 
1) sees cultural diplomacy as an exchange of aspects of culture among 
nations and their people to achieve a better understanding among states. 
In order to experience benefits from cultural diplomacy, it is necessary to 
engender attraction through public diplomacy, which is regarded as one of 
the key instruments of soft power (Melissen, 2005, 4). 
It is the “government’s process of commu-
nicating with foreign publics in an attempt 
to bring about understanding for its nation’s 
ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as 
well as its national goals and policies.” (Tuch, 
1990, 3). 
Along with communicating information and promoting a positive im-
age, public diplomacy aims at building long-term relationships to create a 
conducive environment for government policies (Nye, 2011: 105). Some 
authors do not believe that public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy are 
one in the same, but nevertheless consider public diplomacy an important 
Soft Power and Public Diplomacy
The term soft power is also known as the ‘other face of power’, and as 
‘power by attraction.’ It is recognized for its potential to shape the prefer-
ences or actions of other countries through benignity (how an agent relates 
to others), brilliance (how an agent does things to produce admiration or 
respect), and beauty (agent’s relations to ideals, visions and values) (Nye, 
2004, X, 5; Nye, 2011, 92; Vuving, 2009, 8ff). States usually use power to 
achieve political goals (Nye 2011: 81). In contrast to hard power, which 
relies on the subsidiaries of military power (threat or force) and economic 
power (payments and sanctions), soft power’s primary currencies are cul-
ture, values, policies, and institutions (Nye, 2004, 31; Nye, 2011, 84). 
Despite criticisms that question soft power’s relevance and its clarity and 
utility as a theoretical concept (Fan, 2008; Hocking, 2005; Pells, 1997), 
Nye claims that it is actually hard power which is declining in popularity 
and relevance. This is largely, Nye argues, due to the mounting expenses, 
both financial and social, which are accrued not only through the use of 
force itself, but also through the measures required for its justification and 
popular support (Nye, 2004, 19f). In the absence of force, soft power can be 
a source of attraction promoted by governments or non-profit organizations 
(ibd., 17, 122). According to the author:
“It is possible to get many desired outcomes 
without having much tangible power over oth-
ers. For example, some loyal Catholics may 
follow the pope’s teaching on capital punish-
ment not because of a threat of excommunica-
tion but out of respect for his moral authority. 
Or some radical Muslim fundamentalists may 
be attracted to support Osama bin Laden’s ac-
tions not because of payments or threats, but 
because they believe in the legitimacy of his 
objectives.” (ibd., 2).
However, an oft-noted weakness of soft power is its difficult and time-con-
suming implementation into government strategy. Furthermore, the instru-
ments of soft-power are such that it cannot be entirely controlled by govern-
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tool for the dissemination and exchange of culture and values between one 
country and the general public abroad (Pajtnika, 2014, 101). These efforts 
can easily be dismissed as an attempt to manipulate of foreign populations 
(Melissen, 2005, 11). Public diplomacy targets the general public, non-of-
ficial groups, individuals, and organizations abroad (ibd., 5) in order to en-
gage with the foreign audience and establish long term relationships (ibd., 
21). There are three important dimensions of public diplomacy function to 
create a conducive environment for government policies: daily communi-
cation, strategic communication, and the development of lasting relation-
ships (Nye, 2011, 105). 
As Nye observes, the “effectiveness of public diplomacy is measured by 
minds changed” (ibid., 107). In this respect, several activities must be un-
dertaken in order to influence the public opinion of another state through 
establishing a positive perception of one country. One of the first exam-
ples of a public diplomacy institution is the Alliance Française, founded 
in 1883, which sought to popularize French culture and language as well 
as to restore national prestige after the Franco-Prussian war abroad (Nye, 
2004, 102). Other noteworthy examples of public diplomacy institutions 
include the German Goethe Institute, which promotes German language 
and culture worldwide (Goethe Institut, n.d.); the British Council, which 
also works closely with the British foreign ministry to promote the English 
language and international relations (British Council, n.d.); and the Austri-
an Agency for International Cooperation in Education and Research, which 
is an advocate of international cooperation in education, science, and re-
search and owned by the Republic of Austria (OeAD, 2021, September 2). 
Faith-based institutions have also become increasingly active in public 
diplomacy. Because religions are often transnational in nature, they have 
particular potential to transcend national boundaries to promote certain cul-
tures and values. If we start from a broader understanding of culture as a 
set of practices and values which create meaning for society (Nye 2004: 
11), religion can be used as a “subject and medium” of cultural diplomacy 
(Lenozowski, 2009, 82, 87) or a cultural element of soft power (Golan 
2018). Examining several transnational religious actors, including Roman 
Catholics, American Evangelical Protestants, the Organization of the Is-
lamic Conference, Haynes (2016, 5) came to the conclusion that each actor
seeks to use […] ‘religious soft power’ to ad-
vance their interests […] all wish to see the 
spread and development of certain values and 
norms, which impact on international security 
and order.” 
Emergence of the Muslim religious community in Austria
The diplomatic relations between Austria and Turkey extend back as far 
as 1574, when the first diplomatic mission of the Habsburg Monarchy (or 
Danubian Monarchy) in Constantinople was recorded. In 1791, the first Ot-
toman Embassy was opened in Vienna. With the annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by the “Danubian monarchy,” legalized under international 
law in 1908, the Islamic religion has had a long historical presence on Aus-
trian territory. To institutionalize Islam within the state, Austria-Hungary 
issued a Law on Islam in 1912, pertaining to the recognition and rights of 
those in the country who were followers of Islam.4 One of the outcomes of 
this law was that the adherents of Islam were granted official recognition as 
a religious community,5 which was unique in Western Europe at the time. 
In 1932, the Islamic Cultural Federation (Islamischer Kulturbund) was es-
tablished to unite the Muslims in Austria, including prominent converts 
(Windhanger, 2008, 33f). It was later dissolved by the Nazi regime in 1938, 
after which the 1912 Law on Islam was largely forgotten until the end of 
World War II. 
Since Austria needed workers to rebuild the country after the destruc-
tion of the Second World War, the government began negotiating bilater-
al agreements with foreign countries to facilitate reconstruction. Turkey 
and Austria signed the first agreement on labor recruitment (Anwerbeab-
kommen) in 1969 which enabled ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter) to come 
4 The basis of the Austrian legal framework concerning Religious Societies is freedom 
of religion guaranteed in the Austrian Constitution as well as the guarantee of freedom 
of religion and conscience found in the Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals 
(“Staatsgrundgesetz”) of 1867 and the Law on recognition of Religious Societies (“An-
erkennungsgesetz für Religionsgesellschaften”) of 1874. (Bundeskanzleramt 2019)
5 StGG- Staatsgrundgesetz - Basic Law of 21 December 1867 on the General Rights of 
Nationals in the Kingdoms and Länder represented in the Council of the Realm, RGBl. 
Nr. 142/1867.
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to Austria from Turkey. As a result of the labor migration, the number of 
Muslims in Austria, especially those from Turkey and ex-Yugoslavia, grew 
significantly during the 1960s. By 1974, approximately 31.270 Turkish 
immigrants had arrived in Austria (Lichtenberger, 2000). The majority of 
those workers stayed in the country and were later joined by their fami-
lies through the process of family reunification. The substantial number of 
Turkish immigrants coming to work and live in Austria created a growing 
demand for organizations which would represent the Muslim faith.
The Islamic law of 1912, which remained in oblivion after the collapse of the 
monarchy, was rediscovered in the national library by the Bosnian scholar 
Smail Balić. He and other Muslim intellectuals saw it as a basis for the 
creation of a religious community in Austria. Together with the Association 
of Muslim Social Service, which was working on religious issues and the 
provision of humanitarian aid, they campaigned for an appropriate legal 
framework for incorporating Austria’s Muslim community (Strobl, 1997, 29; 
Sticker, 2008, 3). In 1971, the association applied for approval to establish a 
religious community based on the Islam Law from 1912, which resulted in 
the establishment of the Islamic Faith Community of Austria (IFCA- Islamic 
Faith Community in Austria or IGGiÖ- Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft 
in Österreich). It was recognized as a Public Law Corporation (Grabherr et 
al., 2019, 40) responsible for the official administration of religious affairs 
and the implementation of Islamic Religious Education (IRE) in public 
schools (IGGÖ, n.d.). Today, the IFCA claims to represent all Muslims 
living in Austria (Hafez, 2013, 230), however, not all Muslim communities 
are represented in the IFCA’s High Council. Still the IFCA has the privilege 
of playing the role of mediator on issues of government cooperation, 
thereby limiting the consultation between other Muslim communities and 
the state. The former IFCA president, Fuat Sanac, was heavily criticized 
for approving the Islam Law 2015 (Grabherr et al., 2019: 42; Ortadoğu, 
2013,176; Stricker, 2008, 9).
The Faith-based Public Diplomacy Institution ATIB and its Critics
The Turkish state was increasingly apprehensive of the growing number of 
non-governmental Turkish-Islamic associations in Austria, e.g. Österreich-
Türkische Förderation (ATF), Union Islamischer Kulturzentren (UIKZ) 
and Islamische Föderation (IF), and their influence “in the Islamic religious 
field” (Hafez, 2006, 70; Hafez, 2013, 230). For this reason, it established 
the faith-based public diplomacy institution ATİB in 1990, as a branch of 
the Turkish Diyanet6 (Bauer, 2016, 23; Grabherr et al., 2019, 40; Kroissen-
brunner, 2001, 23). This institution soon rose to become the largest7 mosque 
association of Turkish Muslims in Austria (Bauer, 2016, 23f). According to 
the mission statement of Diyanet in Turkey, it is a particular concern that its 
branches abroad “protect Muslims from assimilation, strengthen their na-
tional identity, and promote integration in their new living space” (Diyanet 
İşleri Başkanlığı, n.d.). Like other Diyanet-linked organizations in Europe, 
ATİB claims to represent ‘Turkish Islam,’ which is portrayed as compatible 
with modernity and democracy (Çitak, 2013, 177). Up until the 2015 Islam 
Law (Islamgesetz 2015) was passed in Austria, the chairman of the ATİB 
was always a diplomat from the Turkish embassy. Additionally, the roughly 
sixty imams in the ATİB mosques were sent from Turkey as employees of 
the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Bauer, 2016, 24; Grabherr et al., 2019, 
40). The imams based their work and preaching on legal opinions (fatwas) 
of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. Like in Turkey, ATİB promotes the 
Hanafi8 School of law, one of the four most widespread schools of Sunni 
Islamic law. Because the Hanafi School had also shaped the Muslim com-
munity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was also the body of law that had 
been recognized by the Islam Law of 1912 (Grabherr et al., 2019, 41).9
However, ATİB’s associations didn’t take part in IFCA until 2011. One 
reason for this is the nature of the relationship between state and religion in 
Austria. The internal, self-determined structure of the IFCA is defined in its 
constitution, which contains, among other things, the so-called ‘one-third 
rule,’ which is heavily criticized by the ATİB. This clause lays out provi-
sions which regulate the linguistic and ethnic composition of the IFCA 
bodies. 
6 Diyanet itself was established in Turkey in 1924 and is today subordinated directly to 
the presidency (Grabherr et al., 2019, 40)
7 Around 75.000 members and around 60 sub-associations (Bauer, 2016, 23f).
8 The Hanafi School is one of the four schools of law in jurisprudence within Sunni 
Islam. It uses reason, logic, opinion, analogy, and preference in the formulation of laws 
and is distinguished from the other schools through its relatively liberal doctrines (Ox-
ford Islamic Studies Online, n.d.).
9 The Austrian Constitutional Court declared this as unconstitutional and the restriction 
of rights to members of the Hanafi School of Law was lifted (ORF, 2020, September 15)
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The IFCA Community Committee consists of nine members, at least half 
of whom are supposed to have Austrian citizenship, and not more than a 
third of whom may belong to a different ethnic and linguistic group (Grab-
herr et. al, 2019, 42; Stricker, 2008, 9; IGGÖ, n.d.).
Although various Austrian institutions accepted the special status of ATİB 
as a part of Turkish diplomacy, the organization is often considered to be 
too close to AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) government. In its early 
years, ATİB was perceived as being oriented against conservative Islam-
ic associations. Later, however, there was an emerging consensus that the 
AKP had begun to infiltrate the Diyanet leadership with party supporters 
and to assert its influence, both in Turkey and among the diaspora, with a 
conservative interpretation of Islam (Grabherr et al. 2016, 42f). According 
to Çitak, the Turkish government is trying to establish a sort of religious 
monopoly, in order to promote Turkish Islam and consolidate national uni-
ty among the Turkish diaspora. This is in stark contrast to the ambitions 
of other governments in Europe to create ‘European Islam’ (Çitak, 2013, 
169). Aslan claims that due to its size, ATİB has many members in the 
IFCA steering committee which is believed to enable it to expand its influ-
ence on Muslim and Turkish communities in Austria (Arslan, 2015; Aslan 
et al., 2017). He attributes the high level of participation of Austrian Turks 
in the 2015 and 2018 elections to the influence of ATİB (Aslan, 2018, 2f). 
The attempted coup d’état in Turkey in 2016 was met by widespread public 
condemnation of the Gülen movement and calls to boycott the institutions of 
its members. This in turn has led to indignation by Austrian party officials, 
and the initiation of proceedings to investigate whether the imams of Diyanet 
are agents of the Turkish government (Aslan, 2018, 8). Another trigger for a 
public debate about the ATİB was an event in 2018, when uniformed children 
in a Vienna mosque belonging to the ATİB re-enacted the 1915/1916 Battle of 
Gallipoli (Çanakkale Savaşı) (Wiener Zeitung, 2018, April 20). Although the 
AKP is accused of using religion and nationalism as foreign policy tools (Ipek, 
2015; Ozturk, 2016; Ozturk, 2018; Ozturk and Sozeri, 2018), Islamophobia 
researcher and political scientist Hafez claims that the AKP has no real reli-
gious base. Until recently, it consisted of various political movements such as 
the Milli Görüs, the Gülen movement, the Sufi Squad, and others. There are 
also factions within the party which, while nationalistic, are not religiously 
conservative or associated with political Islam (Hafez, 2017, February 27). 
According to Muhasilovic (2020, 103ff), Turkey’s faith-based diplomacy 
under the AKP differs from Western models by using the Presidency of Re-
ligious Affairs as the official public diplomacy state institution. However, 
this has created suspicion around the party’s political influence in Austria, 
and as Nye (2004) points out, no country likes to feel manipulated, even by 
soft power. Grabherr et al. (2016, 42f) write that the political developments 
in Turkey do not necessarily have to be reflected in main features of the 
ATİB in Austria, and that all ATİB functionaries cannot be automatically 
assumed to have close connections with the AKP. The ATİB itself repeat-
edly emphasizes its apolitical status and insists that it does not tolerate 
politics of any party in its associations. In 2017, ATİB publicly distanced 
itself from some positions of the Turkish government and for the first time, 
a non-diplomat was elected chairman. 
The Changing Law for Muslims (Islamgesetz 2015) in Austria and Is-
lamophobia on the Rise
Parallel to the discussions about the Turkish public diplomacy intuition 
ATİB in Austria, the debate around changing the Law on Islam from 1912 
began in the Austrian public and parliament. In 2015, a new Islam Law was 
enacted, under the pretext of preventing foreign political and theological 
influences, as well as to promote an understanding of Islam based on Aus-
trian and European values. The main regulation of federal law on the exter-
nal legal relationships of Islamic religious societies in the 2015 Islam Law 
concerned the legal status of Islamic Religious Societies, including their 
structure, rights, and obligations, as well as their relations with the Austrian 
state. Among these societies are the Islamic Community in Austria and the 
Islamic Alevi Community. Among other things, the 2015 Islam Law also 
regulates important issues like the protection of the religion’s name, pas-
toral care, Islamic teleological studies, Islamic graveyards, regulation on 
the interdiction of foreign financing, dietary rules, and the presentation of 
teachings and sources of faith in the German language (RIS, 23.04.2020; 
Federal Chancellery, n.d.). However, the most important intention of the 
Law is to train imams in Austria (§6 and §24 Islam Law 2015). Another 
noteworthy regulation places emphasis on a positive general attitude to-
wards society and the state (§11.3 Islam Law). It is also important to keep 
in mind that “teachings, institutions and customs are not allowed to con-
tradict statutory rules” and that, in that case, the recognition can be taken 
back (RIS, 23.04.2020; Federal Chancellery, n.d.). This was, among other 
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things, a direct attack on the public diplomacy intuition ATİB, who would 
no longer be allowed to receive funding from Turkey, and whose imams 
employed in Austria would be denied any extension of their residency per-
mits. 
In 2021, an initiative started to change the 2015 Islam Law, which was 
launched as a part of an anti-terror package. Suggesting tighter legislation, 
the main amendments proposed by the reforms would introduce better con-
trol of funding sources of Islamic Religious Societies, an easier process for 
the closing down of mosques and religious community centers, and means 
of accessing precise information about which imam is preaching were. This 
would give the Office of Churches and Religions more control over the 
IFCA (Religion ORF.at 2021). The Amendment passed the Austrian Na-
tional Parliament and is currently being discussed by the Federal Council 
(Republik Österreich Parlament, n.d.). 
The efforts to tighten the 2015 Islam Law, in conjunction with public de-
bates and political discourse accompanying this decision, indicate growing 
levels of Islamophobia in Austrian society. This has been galvanized con-
siderably through the new discussions about the proposed amendment. As 
demonstrated in a 2018 study on Islamophobia, conducted by the Universi-
ty of Salzburg, hostility towards Muslims in Austria has increased substan-
tially in recent years. 70% of Austrian citizens think that Islam does not fit 
into the Western world, and the majority of Austrians support stricter reg-
ulations on the practice of Islam. Additionally, 45% of respondents report-
ed that they were in favor of denying Muslims certain rights.10 When we 
take into account that, according to data from 2016, 700.000 Muslims live 
and pay taxes in Austria, a number that has consistently trended upwards 
(Wolfgang Aschauer, n.d.) the attitudes of the general population towards 
Muslims and Islam become an even more delicate issue. 
Numerous examples of these trends can be observed in the political dis-
course of prominent Austrian politicians surrounding the public diplomacy 
institute ATİB and the 2015 Islam Law and its proposed amendment. Be-
fore the Law was implemented for example, MP Mag. Ewald Stadler (Al-
liance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ) posed an inquiry (Parlamentarische 
Materialien, n.d.) to the Austrian parliament in 2011, arguing that the last 
10The study was conducted with 1.200 respondents, about the opinion of Muslims in 
Austria.
IFCA elections represented an agenda of Turkish domination through lob-
bying by the ATİB. 
He went on to criticize ATİB representative Mr. Bozkus his statements that 
ATİB “is not an association dealing with integration,” that the “German 
language does not in itself represent integration,” and that Austrian policy 
needed to be assigned greater “responsibility when it meets integration.” 
Furthermore, he complains about the fact that prayers in ATİB mosques 
are still performed in Turkish and that there is no German version of the 
ATİB homepage. He also points out that Bozkus works as a religious offi-
cial of a foreign state ministry. By comparing MP Stadler’s representation 
of Bozkus’ statements with the original interview which Boskuz gave in 
the Austrian newspaper ‘Die Presse’ (Kocina, 2011, June 3), we are able to 
conclude that these quotes were taken out of context. 
Based on these allegations, MP Stadler questions the Islam Law of 1912 
and asks the Minister for European and International Affairs 21 more ques-
tions in this parliamentary debate. These questions are primarily related to 
the reform of that law, examining whether the IFCA is pursuing the agen-
das of private associations. He also questions whether there are grounds for 
the existence of ATİB, as a state body of Turkey, in Austria. We can clearly 
observe here how the suspicion of the ATİB and of IFCA itself is based on 
the decontextualized statements of the ATİB representative and the victory 
of ATİB within the IFCA elections. Furthermore, these arguments are used 
to mobilize support for the initiative to amend the Islam Law of 1912 by the 
MP. In light of the fact that the ATİB only joined the IFCA in 2011, these 
statements can be understood as expressions of fear regarding the ATİB’s 
level of influence in the IFCA, as well as an outgrowth of competition 
among Austria’s radical right-wing parties and Islamophobic campaigns11 
(Hafez, 2018, 8). 
It is not only Austrian politicians who catalyze debates around foreign in-
fluence in the country. The Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said 
at a 2014 pre-election campaign event in Austria for example that “Turks 
in Europe are the grandchildren of Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent,” and 
proclaimed “You can be proud of this Turkey” (Herger, 2014, June 19). 
Such rhetoric provides ample opportunity for right-wing parties in Austria, 
11The MP’s party, Alliance for the Future of Austria, came about through the break with 
the with the radical right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).
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who are eager to manipulate such statements to imply the impossibility of 
Turkish integration due to Turkish nationalism, or a supposed loyalty to 
Turkey which supersedes their Austrian patriotism. Similarly, such rhetoric 
fuels accusations that the ATİB is involved in Turkish elections. A related 
discourse is embodied by the statements of the former Austrian Minister 
of Integration, Sebastian Kurz (Austrian People’s Party, ÖVP). At the time 
of the implementation of the Islam Law 2015, he repeatedly emphasized 
the need for an Islam with “Austrian characteristics” (Dietrich, 2015, Sep-
tember 22). In a later statement, he claimed that “parallel society, political 
Islam and radicalization have no place in our country.” and that the law 
would be a “step against political Islam” (Deutsche Welle, 2018, June 8). 
From his statements, we can affirm the discursive construction of an ‘Aus-
trian Islam,’ with ‘Austrian characteristics’ and under the control of the 
Austrian state. This ‘Austrian Islam’ is represented as the ‘good Islam,’ 
and juxtaposed to ‘bad Islam,’ manifested in Muslim associations founded 
abroad. His framing has the potential to incite Islamophobia in Austrian 
society by suggesting the latter organizations have radicalizing potential 
and should be held under general suspicion. This is also an example how 
Turkey’s soft power efforts are dismissed as an attempt to manipulate Aus-
trian population. 
After the implementation of the 2015 Islam Law, an ATİB spokesman criti-
cizes the quick implementation of the financing of the imams from abroad, 
stating 
“we have demanded that we have at least three to five years of transition, 
with which we can also pay off the imams from Turkey. Now we have to pay 
the imams ourselves and financially that is a big challenge for the individual 
associations.” (Auerbach, 2017, April 5).12 
Considering that other religious communities, such as the Russian Ortho-
dox Church for example, are allowed to be financed from abroad (Dietrich, 
2015, September 22), the provision in the 2015 Islam Law which bans 
Muslim associations from accepting foreign funds also constitutes discrim-
ination against Muslim religious associations.
On the other hand, the spokesman expressed enthusiasm for the day when 
Austrian-educated imams are in office, because 
12Translated by the author.
“the children understand the Turkish language less and less, it is important 
that they understand what is being preached. And it is important to us that 
the imams also receive an excellent German education.” (Auerbach, 2017, 
April 5).13
His moderate attitude, in the end, may be connected to the fact that, apart 
being an ATİB spokesperson, he was also a politician of the Austrian Peo-
ple’s Party. The fact remains that the new Islam Law came into force in 
2015, and the education of Imams in Austria began in the autumn of 2018. 
The portrayal of all Muslims in Austria as a potential danger is accompa-
nied by acts such as when the Minister of Integration, Susane Rab, (Aus-
trian People’s Party) recently presented a “state map of Islam,” which 
identified mosques and organizations, the names of their leaders, and their 
international connections (ORF 2 27.05.2021). This was heavily criticized 
by, among others, the Austrian Catholic Church (DerStandard, 2021, June 
1) and is reminiscent of a dark past in Austria. 
According to Hafez (2010), right-wing parties see the topic of integration 
and political Islam as an opportunity to collect political points. This precip-
itates distrust and hostility towards Muslims and Islam and has an impact 
on the perceptions and feelings of the country’s Muslims. In the 2012 study 
‘Muslims in Austria,’ the authors conclude that six out of ten Muslims felt 
that they were (at least temporarily) disadvantaged in Austria because of 
their religion (Bauer, 2016, 38).
Constitutional lawyers strongly criticize the Islam Law 2015 for violating 
the principle of equality by discriminatory treatment of Muslims relative 
to other religious communities (ibd, 2016, 4), who, for example, are not 
subject to financial prohibitions in Austria (ORF, 2014, October 3). The 
law has also been characterized by one Islamic legal scholar as “somewhat 
excessive legislation that may also violate the European Convention on 
Human Rights,” and as driven by the “basic political direction of a great 
skepticism about Islam” (Deutsche Welle, 2018, June 8). Hafez sees the 
new restrictions as “institutionalized Islamophobia,” (Hafez, 2017, Febru-
ary 27) and criticizes the common stereotyping of Muslims as disloyal to 
the state (Hafez, 2014, November 3).
Integration politics have proven highly controversial in Austria. When it 
comes to immigrant integration, religion is also heavily politicized. The 
13 Translated by the author.
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initiatives are largely driven by the concern that Islam is a potential po-
litical problem and is incompatible with Western society. The loyalty and 
values of Muslim citizens, who view themselves as Europeans, are regular-
ly questioned (Shakir, 2017, 191). It is important to bear in mind the fact 
that as the Austrian model of religious governance is changing, origin-ori-
ented faith-based Muslim minority organizations will become even more 
relevant. If the state does not succeed in facilitating sustainable integration 
into society, migrants will turn to those organizations in pursuit of their 
rights, and these organizations will offer them a social network. The aim of 
the Austrian government should be to promote equality and integration in 
Austria, while seeking a balance between assimilation and cultural imperi-
alism (Nye, 2011, 87). This could be done in cooperation with those associ-
ations as well as faith-based public diplomacy institutions. In the words of 
Nye: “Soft power need not to be a zero-sum game in which one country’s 
gain is necessarily another country’s loss” (ibd., 2011, 90).
Conclusion
Since the Second World War, the number of Muslim migrants arriving to 
live and work in Austria has continue to rise, creating a need for organized 
religious representation. In 1990, the Turkish faith-based public diploma-
cy institution ATİB was established in Austria, as a branch of the Turkish 
Presidency of Religious Affairs, Diyanet. With over 60 Turkish imams in 
Austria, ATİB was tasked with attending to the religious needs of the Turk-
ish diaspora. Over the past two decades, as the conservative AKP party has 
consolidated power in Turkey, suspicions that the ATİB is being used as 
an instrument of the AKP agenda have sparked heated debates in Austrian 
politics. However, the implementation of the new Islam Law in 2015 led to 
significant changes in the ATİB’s operations. They are no longer allowed 
to employ imams from Turkey, or to receive foreign funding. These re-
strictions have resulted in financial difficulties for the institution as well 
as upended the lives of Turkish imams working in Austria. The extent to 
which these restrictions are justified by any concrete effort on the part of 
the Turkish government to instrumentalize the ATİB as a part of a malign 
foreign policy agenda remains a subject of political controversy. The de-
bates engendered by this controversy have inevitably exacerbated underly-
ing Islamophobia in Austrian society, which calls for extensive monitoring.
The present research has employed critical discourse analysis to demon-
strate the link between the debate surrounding the public diplomacy insti-
tution ATİB, the 2015 Islam Law, and growing Islamophobia in Austrian 
society. By examining the statements of Austrian officials, it becomes clear 
that constructions of Islam as a political threat and incompatible with Euro-
pean values is an enormous aspect of the debates around faith-based public 
diplomacy institutions, religious restrictions, and integration policy. The 
politics and policies of ‘restriction,’ the politicization of Islam in the con-
text of migration issues, and the portrayal of Muslim migrants as disloyal 
or a political threat to the Austrian state are all damaging practices by which 
politicians in Austria galvanize Islamophobic sentiment. Going forward, 
policy makers should understand the potential of their rhetoric and efforts 
to tighten restrictions on Muslim communities to intensify Islamophobia.
To this end, the present research has identified problems that should guide 
policy makers dealing with issues of integration in cooperation with mi-
grants’ associations and faith-based institutions. Austrian decision makers 
should involve representatives of all major associations in the decision-mak-
ing process given that these associations are not all equally represented in 
the IFCA. Greater exchange between government officials involved in in-
tegration policy and representatives of Muslim communities in Austria is 
an essential part of this process. In dealing with contentious issues such as 
radicalization and foreign influence, cooperation between these two sectors 
is especially vital in order to avoid fomenting Islamophobia or resentment 
and ensure an equitable policy towards migrants and minorities in Austrian 
society. 
Finally, in regards to soft power, this paper has shown that Turkey’s pub-
lic diplomacy strategy as embodied in the ATİB in Austria, is an example 
of “soft disempowerment.” The actual Turkish government has acquired 
a largely negative reputation in Western countries like Austria, despite its 
expansive faith-based public diplomacy efforts like the ATİB. The assumed 
close ties between the ATİB and the ruling AKP party have engendered 
suspicion in Austrian society that this supposedly cultural and religious in-
stitution is actually pursuing a Turkish political agenda in Austria. This sus-
picion in turn generates fear of foreign influence in Austrian politics, and 
more specifically, distrust and negative perceptions of the Turkish state, as 
evidenced by the discourse analysis presented in this article. 
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